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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOWELL E. PARRISH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THEODORE H. TAHTARAS, 
and JOSEPHINE 
TAHTARAS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8514 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S'T.A:TEMENT OF FAfCT 
The Respondent adopts the Statement of Facts 
.set forth by the appe1lants, but adds thereto the 
following material facts : 
In addition to the income from the operation 
of a restaurant, appellants also had income from 
real estate rentals (R. 164). No evidence was ad-
duced by appellants as to t;tieir income or financial 
ability to finance a home of the size and style dic-
tated and approved by them. 
The appellants had Mr. Parrish, as an archi-
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teet and friend, help them select a lot in Indian 
Hills at 1510 Ute Drive. They had very definite 
ideas as to the size of the house and the number 
of rooms. Mr. Tahtaras testified: 
"Q. I see. Now when you went up on the hill, 
what conversation, if any, took place between Mrs. 
Tahtaras and Mr. Parrish? 
A. Well we were on the lot - do you mean 
at home or on the lot? 
Q. On the lot. 
A. On the lot? 
Q. Yes. 
A. We stood on some part of the lot there 
and Mrs. Tahtaras started telling Mr. Parrish about 
\Vanting three bedrooms and a utility room upstairs 
and a nice kitchen of course, and a living room 
and a dining room and two and a half baths, I 
remember, two and a half baths. So they talked 
about it a little while. I wasn't saying much, they 
were doing the talking about what the Mrs. wanted." 
(R. 270) 
Mrs. Tahtaras advised Mr. Parrish as to the 
minimum rooms in the house: 
''A. In substance Mrs. Tahtaras said she de-
sired three bedrooms on the main floor, that she de-
sired her living and dining room combined and that 
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she \vanted a breakfast room or a dinette off the 
kitchen, and her utility room upstairs and a two 
cai' garage, and a recreation room downstairs that 
n1ust be corapleted when the house was completed." 
(R.28) 
These requirements were in addition to the 
one that the dwelling be designed like Mr. Parrish's 
own home. See Exhibit 9. 
Exhibits 10 and 11 are the final specifications 
and drawings on the dwellings as finally approved 
by the appellants and then used as the basis for 
taking the first bids. The areas and details had al1 
been approved step by step by appellants through 
the preliminary drawings, schematics and final 
\Vorking plans. ( R. 12 to 30) 
Appellants themselves suggested two contrac-
tors to whom drawings and specifications were sent 
for bidding. (R. 47). The record is undisputed on 
the testimony of Mr. Parrish that the reasonable 
cost of construction of the dwelling as designed was 
$12 .. 00 to $14.00 per square foot; that his own home 
of comparable size and design cost $62,000.00 (R. 
51), and that a very similar house built at the same 
time cost $12.35 per square foot. (R. 17 4). 
The very significant facts must be included 
regarding the excessive bids because of appellants' 
"1egal involvements" (R. 86) and their credit prob-
lems., (R. 173 and 177). 
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Also the record shows the continuing willing-
ness of Mr. Parrish to cut down the plans to reach 
lower bids for appellants, as reflected in the testi-
mony of Mrs. Tahtaras: 
''A. Yes, he says, ''Well, I am revising the 
plans" he said. He said, "I can cut it way down 
for you to meet your price.", and so then we agreed 
with him. He thought he would, you know-and 
then I guess that's all that was said." (R. 257) 
S:TATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANTS REQUESTED THE ARCHI-
TEC'TURAL SERVICES OF MR. PARRISH, APPROVED 
THE DESIGN, DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS 
FOR THEIR HOME AND ARE LEGALLY BOUND TO 
PAY FOR THE SAME. 
POINT II 
THE APPARENTLY EXCESSIVE BIDS RESULT-
ED FROM THE LAWSUITS AND CREDIT DIFFICUL-
TIES OF THE APPELLANTS. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT ARE 
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE 
VALUE OF THE ARCHITECTURAL SERVICES REN-
DERED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANTS REQUESTED THE ARCHI-
TECTURAL SERVICES OF MR. PARRISH, APPROVED 
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THE DESIGN, DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS 
FOR THEIR HOME AND ARE LEGALLY BOUND TO 
PAY FOR THE SAME. 
The record, as testified to by all parties, shows 
that the appellants had been neighbors to Mr. Par-
rish for several years and were familiar with his 
work as an architect and particularly with the new 
home designed and built by him on "I" iStreet. They 
visited at this new home and decided that they 
wanted one like it. 
To this end, they had Mr. Parrish assist them 
in the selection of a sloping view lot in Indian Hills 
and then requested that he design for them a two 
level house "as good as" his. In fact, they were 
very definite as to what this house must contain, 
including three bedrooms on the main floor, along 
with two ti'led bathrooms, living room, dinette, 
kitchen. Then they required that the lower floor 
have a large recreation room, a sewing room and 
a half bath with the usual appurtenances. Step by 
step as the planning developed, Mr. Parrish met 
with the appellants and reviewed the design, size 
and placement of the required rooms and finally 
came up with a full set of drawings and specifica-
tions to meet their demands. Mrs. Tahtaras was par-
ticularly anxious for certain details and Mr. Tah-
taras seemed agreeable to letting her have anything 
she wanted. 
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This actual planning process covered a period 
from the latter part of May, 1954 when the first 
schematic drawings were submitted until Novem-
ber 1954 when the finished drawing were approved 
and ready for the taking of bids. This period al-
lowed the parties mature reflection upon the pro-
posed undertaking and does not show a hasty ill-
conceived venture. Mrs. Tahtaras wanted a home 
as good as the one occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Par-
rish and she visited in their "I" Street house, had 
conferences there concerning the design of her own 
house and suggested revisions to meet her own re-
quirements. 
Can the appellants now be heard to say that 
they should not pay for this professional service 
rendered at their instance and request and solely 
for their benefit? Yet that is their position. The 
sole excuse offered for their refusal to pay is that 
the bids for the construction exceeded their desired 
maximum cost. No complaint is made as to the 
style of design, the number of rooms, their place-
ment or the materials as obvious1y such are the 
items that they desired and that they insisted upon 
and required to be a part of the drawings and speci-
fications. 
On the issue of maximum cost, the Court found 
that: 
'''Defendants employed plaintiff to draw 
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plans for a building, not to exceed $65,000, 
including the architects' but not the cost of 
the lot. 
Plaintiff could have cut the plans to get 
bids of $65,000 less fees or $60,185.18. 
Defendants abandoned their house build-
ing project. 
Defendants are not entitled to any return 
of fees paid. 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment, damage 
calculation on quontum meruit. 
Fee if work had been completed 87o 
of $62,579 is $5,207.12 reduced to maximum 
of 87o of $60,185.12 $4,814.82 
Less lJi al~ocated to building 
suspension 
Less Vs allocated to reducing 
the plans to secure bids 
@ $60,185.18 
Less amount paid 
Judgment for plaintiff and 
against defendants 
(R. 324). 
1,203. 70 
601.85 
1,300.00 
$1,709.27 
The law relating to a quasi-contracts is based 
upon the equitable principle that a person shall 
not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the 
expense of another, and on the principle that what-
soever it is certain that a man ought to do, that the 
law supposes him to have promised to do. ( 17 C.J .S. 
324) 
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The Court had before it the record of exten-
sive architectural services rendered in the design 
of a fine dwelling to meet the demands of the ap-
pellants. The record that the appellants approved 
of these drawings and specifications and requested 
Mr. Parrish to assist them by seking out contrac-
tors to build the dwelling. They selected two such 
contractors to whom invitations for bids were sent. 
All of this part of the services by Mr. Parrish was 
of a special nature in accomodating the appellants. 
Even after the bids came in and were considered 
too high by the appellants (we shall touch upon the 
reasons later) they still requested Mr. Parrish to 
perform more professional services in the modifi-
cation of the plans and specifications to come within 
the $65,000.00 maximum figure imposed by the 
appellants after they had already dictated and ap-
proved of the general size, number and style of the 
rooms and exterior of the dwelling. Once again bids 
were requested and again rejected by appellants, 
and Mr. Parrish was willing and ready to further 
reduce the design and specifications and to seek 
lower bids (R. 257 & 259) but appellants withdrew 
and decided to purchase a house. (R. 260) 
The Court's decision appears to be based upon 
the reasonable value of the services on a quantum 
meruit theory, there are I1Uinerous facts which sus.: 
tain the legal premise for this : 
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Appellants orally hired Mr. Parrish, con-
sulted with him, approved the designing and 
dictated the general size, style and content 
of the proposed residence; 
Appellants on two occasions recognized 
their employment of Mr. Parrish by paying 
to him $300.00 and $1,000.00 repsectively on 
account; 
Appellants signed a written contract 
with Mr. Parrish after his work had already 
been partially performed, which contract con-
firms the intention to use his services, and 
then compensate for the same; 
Mr. Parrish testified as to the reasonable 
value of the services rendered and no con-
tradictory evidence was adduced; 
Appellants, because of their own credit 
problems, discharged Mr. Parrish and with-
drew from the proposed construction of the 
dwelling in January of 1955. 
This problem has been considered by the courts 
on other occasions. The general rule is stated: If 
an architect renders services and there is no agree-
ment respecting compensation, he is entitled to be 
paid the reasonable value of his services. 3 AM. J ur. 
1004, Annotation, 20 A.L.R. 1357. 
The crux of the matter serns to turn on the 
question of whether or not the appellants, by re-
fusing to pursue the modification and re-bidding 
on the house, could then eliminate their accrued 
obligation to pay Mr. Parrish for his services render-
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ed up to that time. It is th~ attitude of appellants 
that Mr. Parrish acted at his own peril i:n tal\:in6 
bids when the same exceeded the expectations of 
the appellants. They seem to forget that Mr. Par-
rish was acting as their agent and as an accomoda-
tion in the taking of bids.- They had dictated two 
of the prospective contractors and he selected the 
others to whom invitations to bid were offered. 
The record shows that it is not uncommon for 
plans to be revised by elimination of areas and de-
tai'ls to reach lower prices. An architect attempts 
to get the very most he can for a client at the in-· 
ception and if the bids are too high, then the process 
of gradual elimination starts by reduction of the 
drawings and specifications to seek out lower bids 
from contractors. Appellants have not alleged or 
contended that they imposed any time limits or date 
restrictions upon Mr. Parrish either as to original 
design or the revisions, but now seek to evade their 
just liabilities by changing their 1ninds and dis-
charging him in the course of his services and prior 
to completion. 
Have appellants been fair in tl1is matter? We 
think not. They were the ones that inYited Mr. Par-
rish to design a house for them as beautiful as the 
Parrish home on "I" Street. (R. 196). The appel-
lants had familiarized then1selves with the Parrish 
home and selected a beautiful view lot location in 
10 
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a new subdivision, Indian Hills, for a similar home. 
In addition, they imposed upon Mr. Parrish mini-
n1um requirements such as three bedrooms on the 
r.aain floor, a breakfast area adjoining the kitchen 
overlooking the view, similar types of materials 
to the Parrish home, recreational areas downstairs, 
"a beautiful home, one that people would look at, 
something that people would be attracted toward 
as they drove by they would stop and look at." (R. 
201) 
Now they are unhappy because such a home 
was designed for them, but the cost exceeded their 
expectations. It was not until the home had been 
fully designed and the working drawings approved 
that the appellants imposed the $65,000.00 maxi-
mum figure upon their architect. (R. 45 and 206) 
This restriction having been so lately imposed after 
the basic design, materials, style and details had 
been agreed upon, should be considered by the court 
in determining whether or not it was reasonable for 
appellants to cut short Mr. Parrish in his efforts 
to scale such down to where acceptable bids could 
be procurred. Mr. Tahtaras had told Mr. Parrish 
to "keep working on it." "The sooner the better". 
(R.284) 
Appellants' appetite for a beautiful home ap-
parently far exceeded their willingness to pay for 
what they wanted. Just what is the responsibility 
11 
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of an architect to the client when the client dic-
tates the requirements and approves the drawings 
at each step of the way? "Good faith and loyalty 
to his employer constitute a primary duty of the 
architect." 3 Am. Jur. 1000. 
"An architect, by every contract, implies 
that he possesses skill and ability, including 
taste, sufficient to enable him to perform the 
required services at least ordinarily and reas-
onably well, and that he will exercise and ap-
ply in the given case his skill, ability, judg-
ment, and taste reasonably and without neg-
lect. The duty owing to his employer is es-
sentially the same as that which is owed by 
any person to another where such person 
holds himself out as possessing skill and abili-
ty in some special employment and offers his 
services to the public on account of his fitness 
to act in the line of business for which he may 
be employed. The skill and diligence which he 
is bound to exercise are such as are ordinarily 
required of architects. He must provide for 
reasonable strength and for proper material 
and character of construction, and he must 
keep abreast of the improveme11ts of the times. 
'The architect's undertakii1g, however, in the 
absence of a special agreen1ent, does not im-
ply or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfac-
tory result, but he is liable only for failure 
to exercise reasonable care and skill. * * *" 
3 Am. Jur. 1001. 
Your court considered a somewhat sin1ilar prob-
lem on architectural fees in Headlund v. Daniels, 
167 Pac. 1170, 50 Ut. 381. Afte1~ work had been 
12 
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done by the architect and some drawings produced, 
he estimated the costs of remodeling the theatre 
would not exceed $30,000.00. The actual remodeling 
cost was $77,000.00. The owner refused to pay the 
architecural fees because of the tremendous increase 
in costs. The judgment of the lower court in favor 
of the architect for his fees was affirmed. There the 
architect's plans were used and the remodeling com-
pleted. But the court seemed to emphasize that the 
excessive cost was not due to the carelessness, negli-
gence or incompetency of the architect. 
"A contract may be -made in which the 
sum named is only by way of estimate, and 
where the instructions given require the prep-
aration of p1ans and specifications for the 
construction of a building according to the 
expressed wishes of the owner as to size, 
method, and details of construction, and mere 
nonconformity in the cost of construction un-
der the plans and specificationas with the 
amount so estimated does not prevent a re-
covery." 6 C.J.S. 310 
See also Schwender v. Schrajt, 141 N.E. 511, 
246 Mass. 523. 
POINT II 
'THE APPARENTLY EXCESSIVE BIDS RESULT-
ED FROM THE LAWSUITS AND CREDIT DIFFICUL-
TIES OF THE APPELLANTS. 
The evidence in the record shows that nearly 
four and one-half months of architecural services 
had been rendered before appellants, when inspect-
13 
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ing the working drawings, finally car{le up with 
the restriction of $65,000.00 maximum cost. They 
would have you think that Mr. Parrish, who pro-
ceeded in good faith in his professional services, 
had done something wrong in not procuring a dec-
laration on price at the outset. The friendly, neigh-
borhood relationship of the parties did not dictate 
such a contractual condition when the appellants 
had told him to design a home as good as his on "I" 
Street. He and they knew the materials, style and 
details in that home. They had watched its construc-
tion and had viewed it and visited in it when com-
pleted. Also they dictated the size and character for 
incorporation in their new house. 
What is there in the record that would have 
advised Mr. Parrish of their unexpressed price re-
strictions prior to this time? Appellants, in a play 
for sympathy, have emphasized that they own a 
small restaurant on West 3rd South where he works 
one shift as a cook and Mrs. Tahtaras works part 
time as a waitress. They omitted any reference to 
the fact that appellants owned "certain real estate 
rentals," (R. 164) a11d that they had bought two 
different homes in very desirable neighborhoods dur-
ing the course of the matters testified to, one on 
upper Sheridan Road and one at 2559 East 13th 
So. In addition they had purchased the view lot in 
Indian Hills upon which the new dwelling was to 
be erected. 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These were not people unfamiliar with property 
and money. At no time did they tender a financial 
statement of their assets and income to support the 
intimation that they could not afford the house they 
asked Mr. Parrish to design for them. 
Now let us look at the bids that were received, 
in light of this background and the fact that Mr. 
Tahtaras was then involved in litigation in the Dis-
trict Court in two lawsuits over commissions and 
contracts on the sales of some of his real estate hold-
ings. (R. 70 and 294) Mr. Tahtaras reiterated that 
he was having some credit difficulties. 
The first bids received on the original design 
with all of the details were: 
Earl Belknap 
Stewart L. Carlson 
Hamer Culp, Jr. 
Alan E. Fors 
$62,589.00 
80,562.00 
82,500.00 
92,500.00 
Then Mr. Parrish revised the drawings and speci-
fications after consultation with appellants, reduc-
ing the square footage from 4500 feet to 3800 feet. 
The bids on this reduced house ran, $73,280.00 and 
$75,987.00. These were undoubtedly too high because 
of the 'legal involvements and credit problems of 
appellants. A contractor cannot be blamed for bid-
ding excessively high when he is to do business with 
a man who was already in court on two alleged 
breaches of contract. 
15 
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The only proper rule in such a case seems to 
be to ascertain what would be the reasonable cost 
of constructing such a dwelling. Mr. Parrish testi-
fied, without contradiction, that from his years of 
experience, and from records of construction of a 
similar house at the same time, the reasonable cost 
of construction of such a home as he had designed 
would be between $12.00 to $14.00 per square foot. 
Let us multiply the 3800 square feet on the revised 
plan by $14.00 per square foot. We get $53,200.00, 
a figures well within the limit of $65,000.00 which 
the court found had been imposed by the appellants. 
Apparently the two contractors bidding the revised 
plans had added $20,000.00 "scare" money as a 
hedge against possible litigation with Mr. Tahtaras 
should they have to sue him for breach of contract. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Mr. Parrish 
was ready and willing to cut down to meet appel-
lants' price. (R. 257) However, Mr. Tahtaras had 
called Mr. Belnap, the original low bidder who had 
withdrawn his bid, and asked him to bid on the 
revised plans. Still he could not get bids as low 
as he wanted then1. When he met with Mr. Parrish 
and discussed the last bids, Mr. Taharas said, "Now 
you will have to forget it." (R. 287) 
The equities of this n1atter certainly predomi-
nate in favor of Mr. Parrish and against the appel-
lants. It is about like the situation which might 
16 
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exist if a client requested his lawyer to prepare, re-
vise and amend an extensive trust agreement to 
assist him in the disposition of his properties. Then 
because one of his sons has offended him, the client 
refuses to execute the trust and then refuses to pay 
his lawyer. 
Here too, because of the "wild" bidding of the 
contractors evidently because of their knowledge 
of the two pending 1aw suits with appellants on al-
leged breach of contract, appellants will not build 
their house and will not pay for the professional 
services rendered. It would appear that the proposed 
contractors were more prudent than Mr. Parrish in 
recognizing appellants' apparent penchant for 
breaching contracts and involving in litigation. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT ARE 
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE 
VALUE OF THE ARCHITECTURAL SERVICES REN-
DERED. 
The trial court filed a memorandum of his de-
cision ( R. 324) , and then signed and entered the 
Findings of Fact and Judgment. (R. 13-16) There 
is substantial evidence in the record to support each 
and a:Il of the Findings of Fact. As we read the brief 
of appellants, they only take issue with the court on 
the following Findings: 
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No.4 and No. 10. The first finds the $65,000.00 
limitation of cost and the second denies a $45,000.00 
cost limitation. Both briefs in the statement of facts 
affirm the existence of testimony to establish the 
court's findings. Mr. and Mrs. Parrish testified 
as to the $65,000.00 limit and Mr. and Mrs. Tah-
taras admitted the conference, but claimed that 
they restricted the cost to $45,000.00. The trial 
court saw and heard the witnesses and for good 
cause elected to believe Mr. and Mrs. Parrish. 
No specific exceptions have been taken as to 
the other Findings. As indicated above, the trial 
court has the prime opportunity to see and hear the 
witnesses, examine the exhibits and study the at-
titudes expressed by the words and actions of each 
one. Upon this premise, he has found in favor of 
the plaintiff and ample evidence exists to sustain 
each Finding. 
From a legal viewpoint the appellants attempt 
to assail the judgment on two major fronts: 
(a) 
(b) 
Appellants claim that the. court 
erred in permitting recovery on 
quantum meruit. 
Appellants assert that when Mr. 
Parrish failed to so revise the plans 
the first tin1e to procure bids under 
the $65,000.00 level, then he cannot 
further revise them or recover for 
his services rendered. 
18 
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On the issue of quantum meruit we not that 
defendants' answer denied the express contract be-
tween the parties and then by way of counterclaim 
set up a different purported oral agreement and 
alleged failure to perform. ( R. 3) In the course of 
trial it appeared to the court that recovery, if any, 
must be based upon the theory of quantum meruit. 
(R. 119) The defendants and their counsel were 
there and then advised that the proceedings would 
continue upon that theory and plaintiff was given 
leave to amend the complaint in conformity there-
with. A second cause of action on quantum meruit 
was then alleged. In connection with appellants' 
motion for new trial an affidavit was filed by Mr. 
Rose alleging those facts and stating that he was 
incapable of meeting the issues fully and fairly. 
However, no allegations were made as to what dif-
ferent or any evidence would have been tendered, 
hence no rea1 value can be assigned to this motion 
and affidavit. 
In the supplement page #19 filed by appel-
lants for their brief, they refer to two recent Utah 
cases, both of which sustain our position, rather 
than that of appellants. Morris v. Russell, 236 Pac. 
(2d) 451, 120 Utah 531 involved an action for serv-
ices rendered. A specific contract was alleged by 
plaintiff and denied by defendant. 'The count for 
quantum meruit was first stricken and then re-
stored: 
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"The essence of the defendants' admis-
sion of an express con tract here is in fact a 
denial of the express contract alleged by the 
plaintiff; they merely admitted that the 
plaintiff was to work for them, but denied 
that they were to pay for the same. That being 
so, it was not error for the plaintiff to have 
his case submitted both on the express con-
tract which he claimed and the defendants 
denied, and also on quantum meruit, the same 
as if there had been a general denial both of 
the services rendered and also the obligation 
to pay therefor. 
* * * "'The adding of the quantum meruit 
count, was the equivalent of permitting an 
amendment to conform to the proof. The de-
fendants were in no worse position than if the 
quantum meruit count had not been there in 
the first place. There is no showing that the 
defendants were mislead or prevented from 
presenting all their evidence or in any way 
prejudiced by reinstating the count." 
In Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp. 264 Pac. (2d) 
279, 1 Utah 2d. 175, the situation is somewwhat 
different. Therein again there was a dispute as to 
the terms of con1pensation for an employee. The 
trial and complaint were under the theory of an 
express agreen1ent. Judgment was on the basis of 
quantum meruit. This judgment was reversed be-
cause "No effort was made to amend the complaint 
to conform to any different proof nor any proof 
affirmatively offered to establish a quantum meruit 
theory." The Mor·ris v. Russell case (supra) was 
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discussed and differentiated on the basis that the 
defendant in the Taylor case had not been called 
upon to meet the issue of quantum meruit. 
These and other cases affirm Utah's accept-
ance of the quantum meruit theory of recovery in 
actions for services rendered, as in ours. Here the 
parties were advised early in the trial that quantum 
meruit was the theory of the case. Opportunity was 
afforded all to present evidence on this. The plain-
tiff did so and establishe dthe reasonable value of 
the services rendered. The defendants, now appel-
lants, fail to state what, if any, different evidence 
they would have adduced. Ammendment of the com-
plaint in conformance with this quantum meruit 
theory and the proof was duly al'lowed. 
The last theory of appellants to be considered 
is their claim that the failure of Mr. Parrish to 
modify the drawings and specification to procure 
sufficiently low bids before appellants decided not 
to build, robs plaintiff of any right to recover. The 
case of Schwender v. Schraft (supra) 141 N.E. 511 
involved architectural services. The owner was ready 
to spend $40,000.00 but insisted that special features 
be incorporated in the structure. Bids exc~eded the 
proposed $40,000.00; revision of the plans to elimi-
nate some features were made and still the bids 
were too high; again the plans were revised down-
ward in a futile effort to reach the price; and then 
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defenda11t decided not to proceed. Recovery was 
awarded to the architect for his fees. The reasoning 
was based upon the premise that the design was 
''according to the expressed wishes of the owner as 
to size, method and details of construction. In such 
a case, mere non-conformity in the cost of construc-
tion tlnder the plans and specifications with the 
amount so estimated does not prevent a recovery." 
A general statement of the law is found at 6 
C.J.S. 328 referring to the rule of damages to an 
architect where the owner has breached his obliga-
tion as here : 
"and, in an action on a quantum meruit in the 
case of part performance, it is the reasonable 
value of the services rendered.'' 
Supporting cases are cited. The evidence of the plain-
tiff showed the many details of the services render-
ed and the reasonable value thereof. Not one item 
of the services was denied by the appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the contract is specific, implied or 
quasi, the undisputed rule is that: 
''one who prevents performance of a contract 
by the other party may not avail himself of 
the wrong and the other party is excused 
from fulfilling the contract." 17 C.J.S. 966 
Here we have Mr. Parrish ready and able to further 
reduce the drawings and specifications so as to 
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n1eet the price requirements, but appellants just 
decided not to bother and terminated his employ-
rnent. They cannot by such arbitrary unilateral ac-
tion escape liability for the reasonable value of the 
services rendered to that date. There is no pretense 
on appellant's part that they had prescribed a time, 
limit beyond which Mr. Parrish could not go. No 
violation as to type, style, detail or appearance of 
design is asserted by them. They have impetuously 
decided not to take further bids or permit Mr. Par-
rish to adjust the details of the house to accomodate 
their pocketbook and their whims at the same time. 
If the rule were otherwise, great injustice 
would be done to professional men, laborers, tech-
nicians and other employees. The caprice of the em-
ployer would measure the compensation rather than 
the reasonable value of the services. 
It is submitted that the judgment of the lower 
court is fully sustained in law and in equity and 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfu1ly submitted, 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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